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Thus, in the non-stationary case also, given the probability that initially the process
was in, say state j (i.e., p0
j(0) = Pr{X0(0) = j}), then the probability that it is in state
k after n time steps and at time t is represented as pn
k(t) = Pr{ Xn(t) = k} and is
given by:
pn
k(t) =
m X
j=0
[p0
j(0)] × [Qn
jk(t)] (6)
where Qn
jk(t) = [P0(0)] × [P1(1)]... × [Pn−1(t − 1)].
Therefore, we now have a means of obtaining the probability distribution of the process
and, thereby, the probability distribution of strategies at any stage in the negotiation
process given an initial distribution of strategies and the transition probability matrices.
Now, we come to the main issue of learning the transition probability matrices. As
already stated, we propose to do this using Bayesian inference rules. However, to do this
we must assume that the learning agent, in our case the buyer X, has some knowledge
about the negotiation process. Speciﬁcally, in order to update its hypothesis about the
strategy distribution of Y from the offers that it receives, it has to know how the offer
generation process depends on the strategy selection process. To this end, let us assume
that S, the set of all possible strategies that Y can use, and as such constitutes the state
space of our Markov chain, is given by S = {so
0,so
1,...,so
m}. Therefore, Y switches
between the strategies in S according to the transition probability matrix Pn(t), which
varies with time. We let On(t) represent a sequence of offers made by Y and Op
n(t)
represent the event that the offer at the nth step of the process at time t is p. We also let
Hn(t) represent a sequence of ﬁnite sets of hypotheses about Pn(t) during the negoti-
ation process. Therefore Hn(t) = {H1
n(t),...,Hk
n(t)}, where k is some ﬁnite positive
integer. We assume that the hypothesis representing the true value of the transition prob-
ability function also belongs to Hn(t). Then the objective of our learning algorithm is
to update each of these hypotheses {Hi
n(t) ∈ Hn(t)} at every step n of the negotiation.
The steps of the algorithm are detailed in Algorithm 1. In more detail, using Bayes rule
we have for each hypothesis, at step n of the process that:
Pr{Hi
n(t)|Op
n(t)} =
Pr{Hi
n(t)} × Pr{Op
n(t)|Hi
n(t)}
Pi=0
k [Pr{Hi
n(t)}] × [Pr{O
p
n(t)|Hi
n(t)}]
(7)
We call Pr{Hi
n(t)|Op
n(t)} the likelihood function, L. Thus each Hi
n(t) is updated
in the light of the incoming offer Op
n(t). Now, B uses the hypothesis Hnew
n (t) = Pi=0
k {Pr{Hi
n(t)|Op
n(t)} × Hi
n(t)} to ﬁnd the strategy used by the opponent. There-
fore the learning agent weights the different hypotheses by the probabilities of their
occurring in order to form a new hypothesis about Pn(t). Because of this construc-
tion of the new hypothesis we can show that, as t → T where T is sufﬁciently large,
Hnew
n (t) approaches the true value of Pn(t) (see theorem 2 for details). Then, accord-
ing to un
sx(t), the agent determines the strategy sn
max(t) that maximises un
sx(t) at each
step of the negotiation process. We denote this maximum value of the payoff function
by un
smax(t). This completes the solution procedure for determining the best response